I’m interested in a range of philosophical topics, but the heart of my interest is ethics, and especially Kantian ethics.

Reason, Emotion, and Consequence: Moral Psychology and Kantian Ideals

My first project was to look to Kant’s discussions of moral ideals (the virtuous person, the ethical community, the highest good, and friendship) to argue that his framing of these concepts as ideals is an underutilized resource for Kantians.  I argue that Kantian ideals help Kantians respond to criticisms that Kantian ethics is inadequate to capture important features of our moral psychology (especially consequence and emotion).

From this project:

My “The Kingdom of Ends as Ideal” was published in Human Dignity and the Kingdom of Ends (Routledge 2021), edited by Jan-Willem van der Rijt and Adam Cureton.

Abstract: The kingdom of ends is one of a handful of concepts that Kant describes as an ‘ideal’ in his ethical writings. This paper uses contemporary accounts of imagination in order to explain how imaginative engagement with the kingdom of ends (and other Kantian moral ideals) can help to coordinate other parts of our moral psychology with what reason requires of us. In particular, imaginative immersion with an ideal of the moral community can serve to channel our social desires and improve our deliberation.

My “Friendship as a Scaffolding Duty to the Highest Good” was published in Kant on Sex, Love, and Friendship (De Gruyter Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, Vol. 222), edited by Pärttyli Rinne and Martin Brecher.

Abstract: This essay begins with a brief introduction to what Kant says about the ideal of friendship, as well as his other categories of friendship. Then it examines an account of Kantian friendship that argues that we must engage in moral friendships, as they are a necessary means to develop virtue. This essay will suggest that that account needs two extensions. First, moral friendship is in the service of both of our imperfect duties: of self-perfection, and also of helping others. Second, the best human friendships can help us see, in microcosm, what a kingdom of ends where we bring about our own perfection and the happiness of others could be like. As such, moral friendship, which may actually be achieved ‘here and there’, helps to secure our hopes for what is possible as a result of our moral activity.

Giving Up on Someone

My second project is on the topic of giving up on morally or otherwise unpleasant people. Some people—maybe even our own parents, children, and partners—are reprehensible. When ought we give up on them?

“Giving Up on Someone”, published in The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (25:1 2023)

Abstract: We usually think nothing of our practice of ‘giving up’ on someone who has behaviors or attitudes that are morally criticizable—after all, it is my prerogative to choose with whom I will associate, and exclusion seems to be an unobjectionable part of my toolkit of social sanctions. However, this paper will argue that it is in many cases impermissible to give up on a morally unpleasant person—in fact, it would be to make an unjustified exception for oneself.

This project is currently in-progress for being extended to a book (under contract, Lexington Press).

Ethics and Technology Works-in-Progress

I have two current works-in-progress on ethics of technology:

“Violence and Cyber Violence”

Presented as a webinar for the Canadian Society for the Study of Practical Ethics (January 2022) and at the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics (February 2022).

Abstract: Christopher Finlay’s (2018) “Just War, Cyber War, and the Concept of Violence” argues that some kinds of cyberattacks are morally equivalent to armed kinetic attack (358), and that just war theory should permit ‘violent cyberattacks’ to be responded to with kinetic violence (and vice versa) (374). In turn, I argue that Finlay’s account of violence is both too wide—by improperly including harms to property as if they are commensurable with harms to persons—and too restrictive—by not including psychological harms to persons. I present an alternative conception of the term ‘violence’: that it is better understood as harms to persons, brought about for the purposes of aggression and domination.

This discussion allows us to take on a major debate in the violence literature: theorists such as C. A. J. Coady, Trudy Govier, and Finlay acknowledge that structural injustices such as racism or sexism or other kinds of oppression cause great harm, but contend they are wrongly miscategorized as violence. On my view, structural injustices do indeed do violence: they bring about injury (both psychological and bodily) for the purposes of aggression and domination. It is a collective act of violence, and as such harder to recognize. Yet structural violence has the same characteristics as the most paradigmatic cases of violence. With these ideas in place, I finally argue how we should understand cyber violence, and what kinds of responses to cyber violence are warranted.

“Creepy Privacy”

We often use creepiness as a proxy for whether or not something is a breach of privacy, particularly in the case of digital privacy. But what, exactly, is creepiness? Does it serve us well as such a proxy?

Abstract: Concerns over digital privacy are often expressed in terms of ‘creepiness’: that we can (and should!) use our feelings of whether or not something is creepy to identify potential breaches of privacy. Yet this emphasis on creepiness is a problem. Not only do feelings of creepiness sometimes misfire, but technologists have focused on altering user-perceptions rather than addressing privacy issues directly. Some scholars (Richards 2022) conclude, thus, that ”creepiness” is a mere distraction. I argue that is not the case either. This paper argues for what creepiness really is, what it does for us, and how it can rightly serve as a guide when thinking about the development of technology.